CLOSING TIME
Houthi insiders told me Bab el-Mandeb is next
By Andrew Asani*
Today, odds on Polymarket for the Houthis to close Bab el-Mandeb by 30 September 2026 stand at just 14%.
In my last piece for The Oracle, I argued that the Houthis were unlikely to close off this critical Red Sea chokepoint due to their increasing financial dependence on Saudi Arabia.
Things have changed.
Based on my recent conversations with several Houthi insiders, I believe Polymarket is significantly underestimating the odds for a Bab el-Mandeb closure today.
Despite the potential risks, closing the waterway remains the cheapest and most effective way for the Houthis to achieve their primary aim of forcing the US and its allies to de-escalate against Iran, at a time when most other options have been exhausted.
The Houthis support de-escalation as US-Israeli strikes on Iran have severely weakened the logistics infrastructure of the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the hardline paramilitary that oversees Tehran’s proxy network and serves as the Houthi’s top arms and fuel supplier, financier and patron. Without IRGC support, the balance of power within Yemen would shift in favor of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, as the Houthis are currently too weak to confront their domestic enemies by themselves.
The Houthis previously sat out prior rounds of US-Iranian warfare in June 2025 and February-April 2026 as the stakes then were not as high. Following a ceasefire on 02 April 2022 that ended the 7-year civil war between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government, Riyadh quietly began providing the Houthis monthly payments of roughly $100m to ensure quiet on its border. The Houthis became dependent on these transfers and in June 2025 were reluctant to launch attacks against US and allied forces that could provide Saudi Arabia a pretext to cut off payments.
At the time, the Houthis were caught between two rival patrons: Saudi Arabia, which they relied on for financing, and Iran, their main weapons supplier.
However, the expansion of US airstrikes in Iran to include energy and civilian infrastructure along with steps taken by the Trump administration signaling intent to seize key Iranian islands and even carry out a ground invasion—which the White House has instructed the Pentagon to develop plans for—have shifted the Houthis’ calculus and made the group more responsive to Iranian demands for assistance.
A member of the Houthi Political Bureau told me that Iranian operatives have deployed across Yemen and are driving the current escalation in the Red Sea, adding that the Houthis are following IRGC requests because continued aid is contingent on meeting certain Iranian directives.
That said, should the United States continue to prosecute the war and remain undeterred by Iranian counter measures the Houthis will likely resume attacks on commercial shipping as a measure to help protect Iran and ensure continued access to IRGC patronage.
A relative of the Houthi’s Jihad Council—the group’s top decision making body—claimed that in the event of an expanded US-Israeli campaign in Iran, the Houthis would escalate their attacks to include shipping in Bab el-Mandeb as deterrence to prevent further US strikes and the collapse of IRGC logistics networks.
That the Houthis would do so appears plausible in light of reports that IRGC operatives in Yemen have begun preparations to develop a Red Sea “authority”—similar to Iran’s newly created Persian Gulf Strait Authority —to extract tolls from ships in the Red Sea.
Shuttering the Bab could trigger the opposite response: a vicious US counter campaign which the Houthis would not be able to withstand. However, opinion polls showing overwhelming opposition to the war within the United States and reports claiming that American interceptors and munitions stockpiles have been depleted below levels previously thought cast doubt on such a prospect.
That said, closing Bab el-Mandeb remains a low-cost method for the Houthis to force the United States to de-escalate against Iran and pressure Saudi Arabia to hold off support for anti-Houthi forces that have recently increased their attacks on the group. Beginning on 20 July 2026, the Houthis attempted to deter Saudi-backed anti-Houthi forces in Yemen by imposing a blockade on Saudi ports and conducting symbolic strikes on energy infrastructure.
However, these strikes failed to achieve the desired effect, instead triggering violent Saudi and Yemeni government reprisals, the first major act of hostilities between both sides since the 02 April 2022 ceasefire. The Houthis have responded by deploying large-scale reinforcements across the country, including to the southwest coastal province of Ta’iz, overlooking the strategic waterway.
Cracking at the Seams
My senior Houthi contacts describe a group unable to afford renewed full-scale war with Saudi-backed Yemeni forces, following renewed pressure placed on the group by the second Trump administration. The 2025 US-UK Operation Rough Rider and subsequent Israeli strikes degraded Houthi leadership, weapons stockpiles, and port infrastructure, prompting the Houthis to reduce their Red Sea shipping attacks—especially after the October 2025 Israeli-Hamas ceasefire—and cutting the group’s revenue.
Expanded US sanctions further squeezed the group’s income from customs and limited their access to fuel needed for missile production. Financial strains in early 2026 triggered several waves of mass defections and three leadership purges from April-June 2026 over alleged Saudi espionage. Tribal unrest, including July 2026 clashes with Daham tribesmen in Jawf governorate over land disputes, further destabilized Houthi control and prompted defections.
These pressures have made the Houthis more receptive to Iranian escalation calls, hoping for greater support. On 17 June 2026, the US provided Iran a temporary sanctions waiver to sell petroleum products, enabling Tehran to net roughly $5bn-6bn before US-Iran hostilities resumed on July 11. During this period, Iranian funds flowed to Hezbollah and the Houthis, including at least two Iranian arms shipments intercepted by Yemeni government forces on 29 June and 14 July 2026—the first in 2026—that contained heavy drone/missile manufacturing equipment.
What To Watch
After more than a year of electing to sit out fighting between US and Iran due to fears of antagonizing Riyadh, it now appears the Houthis are leaning closer towards Tehran. As the group becomes more desperate, it will continue to do so. However, the Houthis still seek to avoid the type of escalation in Iran and Yemen that can degrade the IRGC and Houthis themselves enough to embolden Saudi Arabia and invite a resumption of full-scale war.
That said, for the foreseeable future, Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia will mirror US escalation in Iran itself. Should the United States follow through with plans to seize strategic Iranian islands, prepare a ground invasion or expand its target list to include a wider range of civilian and energy infrastructure, the Houthis will likely have little choice but to play their final card and close Bab al-Mandab.
The best sources to follow for updates include the daily “Iran Report” by the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats project, which does a great job at cataloguing every kinetic strike in the region. For minute to minute updates, great X accounts to follow include @OSINTdefender, the Yemeni @SanaaCenter think tank, and Times of Israel correspondent @manniefabian.
* Andrew Asani is the pseudonym of an OSINT-HUMINT researcher who tracks extremist patronage networks across the Middle East, including Syria, Yemen, North Sinai, Libya and Sudan. He advises clients performing strategic advisory and litigation support, and his work has been featured in numerous academic journals and news outlets.
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Two of the weapon systems not deployed to the Gulf are the B-52 and the B-1. Seems to me Yemen would be a great target for both in carpet bombing them into submission.